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ABSTRACT: This article assesses the American-Russian economic relationship,
identifying how Russia exploits strategic asymmetries to gain advantage in the
space below armed conflict and how the United States can modernize its economic
statecraft. It draws upon a wide range of comparative research, from US-Russian
military thought to the American-Eurasian economic interrelationship, to evaluate
the full range of economic statecraft within a single dyad of countries in the context
of coercion theory. This analysis will assist American policymakers in reforming
priorities and processes according to principles of economic statecraft to sustain
ongoing American coercion and set conditions for advantage upon the return to
bilateral competition.
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S

ince the 2014 Crimean crisis, American policy has attempted to coerce
Russia into abdicating its gains and to deter it from future aggression. But
from armed intervention and assassination to election meddling and energy
manipulation, American policy has failed to exact fundamental concessions.1 Russia’s
massing of troops and invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 are only the most recent
signals of the US government’s inability to effect Russian behavioral change.
Today, the United States finds itself in a state of economic war with Russia.2
The United States has mobilized its economic instruments of power against Russia,
unleashing an unprecedented package of export, debt, banking, and individual
restrictions.3 Alhough the cascading externalities of deploying so many economic
weapons have yet to be determined, American economic action today will play center
stage in future Russo-Ukrainian deescalation, bilateral competition with Russia, and
the global financial system at large.4 The United States must exploit this opportunity
to shape the international and bilateral relationship to return to future competition
1. Thomas Wright, “Russia: What’s Old Is New Again,” in Melanie Sisson, James Siebens, and Barry Blechman,
eds., Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy: The Use of Force Short of War (New York: Routledge, 2020), 132–45.
2. David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020), 35–37.
3. Scott Anderson, Julia Friedlander, and Rachel Zeimba, “The Lawfare Podcast: Making Sense of the
Unprecedented Sanctions on Russia,” Lawfare (blog), March 1, 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare
-podcast-making-sense-unprecedented-sanctions-russia.
4. Maxim Mirnov, “Why Strangling Russia’s Economy Could Backfire: Harsh Sanctions Could Make the
Country a Bigger, Badder North Korea,” Foreign Affairs (website), March 11, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/russia-fsu/2022-03-11/why-strangling-russias-economy-could-backfire; and Zongyuan Liu and Mihaela
Papa, “The Anti-Dollar Axis: Russia and China’s Plan to Evade US Economic Power,” Foreign Affairs (website),
March 7, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-03-07/anti-dollar-axis.
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on better terms.5 Not since the September 11 attacks has the United States been
presented such an open policy window to remake domestic and partner economic
relationships to improve US national security.6 This article looks to the past to
inform this future competition by examining why the United States has been
unable to translate its economic endowments into capable and credible force
against Russia in gray-zone competition.
This failure stems from a strategic misalignment: The conventional paradigm
of US deterrence policy is fundamentally misaligned with the core, nonmilitary
means of Russia’s gray-zone strategy. Chief among these largely misunderstood
means is an engine of licit and illicit economic interests. The policy of the United
States has largely stagnated in a Cold War paradigm of military and economic
deterrence. Today, though, the dollar and tools of economic statecraft are
mightier than the sword.7 Russian strategies of economic influence have seized
this initiative. Russia’s continued penchant for gray-zone aggression, according
to US intelligence estimates, reflects an assessment the West is either unwilling
or unable to inflict the requisite pain below the threshold of armed conflict.8
Coercion, the alignment of adversary incentives to induce desired behavior, is
akin to a negotiation; threats must evolve to reflect both a target’s interests and
competencies and the coercer’s changing leverage.9 Administrations may change
in the United States, but its Russian gray-zone policy problems remain the same.
Without a more robust counter to its economic statecraft, Russia will continue to
reap gains in future competition with the West.
This article proposes a revised policy program to achieve the coercion the United
States desires vis-à-vis Russia through economic statecraft (or the use of economic
tools as nonmilitary means to promote beneficial geopolitical and domestic
results).10 First, the article identifies shortfalls in US-Russian policy through the
lens of economic statecraft—how Russia achieved its gains, how American policy
stagnated, and how this asymmetry manifests in practice. The article then outlines
how the United States can modernize its economic tools, improving effectiveness
and efficiency to leverage the nation’s capacity for economic statecraft to establish
gray-zone deterrence through a triad of domestic coordination, international
cooperation, and transatlantic transparency.
5. Christopher Kolenda, Zero-Sum Victory: What We’re Getting Wrong about War (Lexington: Kentucky
University Press, 2021), 1–17.
6. Juan Zarate, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare (New York: PublicAffairs,
2013), 15–45.
7. Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2016), 33–48; and Benn Steil and Robert Litan, Financial Statecraft: The Role of
Financial Markets in American Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 5–30.
8. National Intelligence Council, Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal
Elections, ICA 2020-00078D (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, March 2021).
9. Tami Davis Biddle, “Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners,” Texas National Security
Review 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020).
10. Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means, 20.
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Translating Economic Coercion in the Gray Zone
The United States’ core problem in combating Russian gray-zone aggression is
one of latency. Despite both relative and absolute economic disadvantage, Russia
is better at mobilizing economic means into capable and credible force for two
reasons. First, the United States has failed to understand the changing nature of
the Russian security dilemma and the resulting emphasis on malign economic
coercion. Second, the United States has not adapted its logic and methods of
economic statecraft. This misalignment carries significant strategic problems
during bilateral, gray-zone competition because the United States has failed to
generate the domestic unity of effort, broad international enforcement, and
necessary measures of success required to deter Russia.

Strategic Misalignment and Economic Statecraft
Since the Cold War, Russian strategy has evolved based on Russia’s assessment
of the American-led threat of forging greater emphasis on nonmilitary means.
Russia observed a pattern of forcible regime change that exploited the changing
nature of war.11 Interventions in Iraq, the former nation of Yugoslavia, Haiti,
Afghanistan, and Libya exemplified how the United States wielded nonmilitary
means, including the use of economic sanctions and isolation to converge on a
state’s external and internal vulnerabilities.12 Consequently, Russian strategy
emphasizes the continuous use of nonmilitary means. Short of conflict, Russian
policy tools leverage licit and illicit methods, particularly in the informational
and financial domains, to establish favorable diplomatic conditions.13 Russian
nonmilitary action constantly seeks to suppress internal conflict from
US exploitation and to manipulate other states’ vulnerabilities.14 During conflicts,
Russia focuses on preemptive action across the country’s instruments of policy to
consolidate political gains.15 This approach increases adversaries’ costs and enables
crisis resolution on Russia’s terms, despite its material disadvantage.16

11. Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking
the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” Military Review 96, no. 1 (January–February
2016): 24.
12. Charles Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review 96, no.1 (January–February 2016): 32–34.
13. Heather Conley et al., The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence in Central and Eastern
Europe (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016), 2–4.
14. Timothy Thomas, “The Evolving Nature of Russia’s Way of War,” Military Review 97, no. 4
(July–August 2017): 38.
15. Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
Aspirations (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017), 23.
16. Scott Boston and Dara Massicot, The Russian Way of Warfare: A Primer (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2017), 7; and William Burns, The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case
for Its Revival (New York: Random House, 2019), 233.
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Malign economic influence underlies all components of Russian strategy,
particularly below the threshold of armed conflict.17 In practice, Russian strategy
functions along two tracks centered on economic statecraft. First, Russian
patronage networks exert direct and indirect pressure on a target state’s decision
making. Russian state entities and proxies exploit nontransparent economic
structures to influence democracies without attribution; this strategy is known
as “malign finance.”18 Russia exchanges financial, military, and technical support
with targeted individuals and groups for regime loyalty.19 Russia also reserves a
tremendous amount of resources for these networks. The country yields the
world’s largest system of crony capitalism. An estimated $300 billion of
oligarch money has left Russia since 2006, including at least $300 million to
malign finance.20
Second, Russia seeks dominance of strategic sectors—particularly energy,
military industry, and finance—through the manipulation of corporate ownership,
direct investment, bilateral trade, and private holdings.21 Together, these tracks
generate a pronounced information asymmetry, a condition in which one party
possesses superior understanding in one or more transactions, for Russia relative to
the Western free market.22 Russia applies these measures to exploit the preferences,
vulnerabilities, and resiliencies of target states, generating disproportionate
influence at a relatively low cost.23 These licit and illicit measures offer carrots
without the risk of uncertain capital markets or political conditionality. The
measures also form the “stick” that can effectively cripple a state’s sovereignty by
co-opting a target country’s sociopolitical elites.24 Russia has increasingly leveraged
these tools to destabilize target countries over time, perpetrating the vast majority
of world malign finance cases since 2013.25
17. Undermining Democracy: Kremlin Tools of Malign Political Influence, Before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement
of Peter B. Doran, president and chief executive officer of the Center for European Policy Analysis).
18. Josh Rudolph, Regulating the Enablers: How the US Treasury Should Prioritize Imposing Rules on
Professionals Who Endanger National Security by Handling Dirty Money (Washington, DC: Alliance for
Securing Democracy, September 2021), 9–10.
19. Conley et al., Kremlin Playbook, 13.
20. Josh Rudolph and Thomas Morley, Covert Foreign Money: Financial Loopholes Exploited by
Authoritarians to Fund Political Interference in Democracies (Washington, DC: Alliance for Securing
Democracy, August 2020), 61; and “Our Crony-Capitalism Index Offers a Window into Russia’s
Billionaire Wealth,” Economist (website), March 12, 2022, https://www.economist.com/finance-and
-economics/2022/03/12/our-crony-capitalism-index-offers-a-window-into-russias-billionaire-wealth.
21. Undermining Democracy: Kremlin Tools of Malign Political Influence, Before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, 116th Cong. (2019)
(statement of Michael Carpenter, senior director of the Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement).
22. Nicholas Poitiers et al., “The Kremlin’s Gas Wars: How Europe Can Protect Itself from Russian
Blackmail,” Foreign Affairs (website), February 27, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles
/slovenia/2022-02-27/kremlins-gas-wars.
23. Ryan Orsini, “Guns, Butter, and Tweets: The Effectiveness of Modern Russian Statecraft” (master’s
thesis, Georgetown University, 2020), 13.
24. Conley et al., Kremlin Playbook, 2.
25. Rudolph and Morley, Covert Foreign Money, 65.
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These Russian tools counter two of the West’s main nonmilitary advantages:
economically interdependent alliance networks and the dollar-based sanction.
Russian economic statecraft generates “underbalancing” against the country
among Western allies.26 As a result, bilateral economic interests with Russia
attenuate the tendency for smaller states to band together in the face of Moscow’s
aggression. These interests also insulate Russian actors and systems targeted by
Western sanctions. Cyprus exemplifies how geopolitical underbalancing generates
perverse cycles of Russian influence. Russia dominates Cypriot investment inflow,
securing a financial foothold that shields oligarch assets and proliferates influence
across transatlantic political systems through offshore accounts.27 Russian
nonmilitary means exploit gaps in the international hierarchy and authority to
which the United States has grown accustomed, magnifying an ongoing decline in
American financial, military, technological, and informational power advantages.
In addition, the American deterrence policy has largely extended the
Cold War–era paradigms of coercion, misjudging and discounting Russia’s
changing security dilemma, and emphasizing nonmilitary means.28 The Cold
War emphasized military deterrence and the complementary means of economic
statecraft centered on sanction—actions designed for an era of limited economic
interdependence between the Soviet Union and NATO.29 The Cold War also
emphasized a linear conception of the political utility of force between nonmilitary
and military means along horizontal and vertical dimensions of escalation.30
Following the Soviet collapse, this paradigm drove a flawed deterrence strategy and
unnecessarily isolated Russia through predominantly military instruments.31 This
conceptual stagnation is even more damaging in the Putin era, in which Russia’s
malign economic activity exploits gaps in detection, attribution, and response.32
Further, gray-zone aggression during this era is often misattributed in Western
studies as a uniquely Russian way of war, resulting in a lack of critical review of
26. Mikael Wigell and Antto Vihma, “Geopolitics versus Geoeconomics: The Case of Russia’s
Geostrategy and Its Effects on the EU,” International Affairs 92, no. 3 (2016): 605.
27. Michael Peel, “Moscow on the Med: Cyprus and Its Russians,” Financial Times (website), updated
May 15, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/67918012-9403-11ea-abcd-371e24b679ed; and Paul Massaro
and Amelie Rausing, “Russia’s Weaponization of Corruption and Western Complicity,” Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (website), updated June 6, 2017, https://www.csce.gov/international
-impact/russia-s-weaponization-corruption-and-western-complicity?page=2.
28. Andrew Monaghan, Dealing with the Russians (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2019), 93.
29. Robert Gates, “The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy: The United States Must Recover
the Full Range of Its Power,” Foreign Affairs (website), July/August 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/united-states/2020-06-02/robert-gates-overmilitarization-american-foreign-policy.
30. Forrest Morgan et al., Managing Escalation in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2008), 18–23.
31. Richard K. Betts, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence: What the Strategy That Won the Cold War
Can—and Can’t—Do Now,” Foreign Affairs (website), March/April 2013, https://www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/united-states/2013-02-11/lost-logic-deterrence.
32. David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2022), 150–64.
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the United States’ nonmilitary weaponry during competition.33 Without strategic
empathy for Russia and the larger geopolitical context, the United States lacked
the ability to sequence and vary military and nonmilitary force combinations
appropriately.34 Thus, the sanction, one of the United States’ primary weapons in
gray-zone competition, has become overused, despite the tool’s ineffectiveness,
which results from its lack of precision.35 Unable and unwilling to adapt, the
United States yielded many of the post–Cold War advantages the nation could
have used in its coercion policy against Russia.
Since the 2013–14 Ukraine crisis, this outdated concept has increasingly led
to a misunderstanding of Russia’s means and an overestimation of American
actions. Western sanctions negatively impacted Russian gross domestic product,
international reserves, and concentrated losses within the Russian defense, energy,
and equity markets following the 2013–14 crisis.36 The purpose of sanctions
is always multifaceted in practice, and US-led action raised the cost of Russian
noncompliance by removing resources available for various Kremlin objectives.37
However, the direct effect of American sanctions on Russia after the Crimean
crisis, has been overstated.38
Commonly used measures of pain inflicted by sanctions (such as damage to
Russian markets and gross domestic product) now appear to be driven primarily
by modern oil-price volatility.39 Meanwhile, other tools of economic statecraft,
including a wealth of financial and monetary tools (such as cross-border flows),
continue to receive little attention in American literature and policy. Thus, although
overt military aggression subsided, Russia continues to implement its asymmetric
strategy. If coercion truly occurs “in the mind of the potential aggressor,” then
American policy has fallen short.40 For Russia, economic sanctions, military
posturing, and diplomatic isolation are modest costs compared to the strategic
benefit of aggression.

33. Ilmari Käihkö, “The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare: Implications for Strategy and the Military
Profession,” Parameters 51, no. 3 (2021): 117–20, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/11/.
34. H. R. McMaster, Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World (New York: Harper Collins,
2020), 15–16.
35. Daniel Drezner, “The United States of Sanctions: The Use and Abuse of Economic Coercion,”
Foreign Affairs 100, no. 5 (September/October 2021): 142–54.
36. Giorgio Castagneto-Gissey and Eugene Nivorozhkin, “No Contagion from Russia toward
Global Equity Markets after the 2015 International Sanctions,” Economic Analysis and Policy 52,
issue C (2016): 79; and Cory Welt et al., US Sanctions on Russia, RL45415 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, updated January 2022), 46–52.
37. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 20–23.
38. Evsey Gurvich and Ilya Prilepskiy, “The Impact of Financial Sanctions on the Russian Economy,”
Russian Journal of Economics 1, no. 4 (2015): 359.
39. Christian Dreger et al., “Between the Hammer and the Anvil: The Impact of Economic Sanctions and
Oil Prices on Russia’s Ruble,” Journal of Comparative Economics 44, no. 2 (May 2016): 295.
40. Karl P. Mueller, “Conventional Deterrence Redux: Avoiding Great Power Conflict in the 21st
Century,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 4 (Winter 2018): 78.
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Bleeding Coercion: Manifestations of the Problem in Practice
American misalignment manifests in a policy that lacks domestic unity of
effort, broad international enforcement, and necessary measures of success, each of
which is an important component of effective economic statecraft.41 Despite the
country’s raw economic potential, the United States’ chronic inability to organize
and deploy economic statecraft has continued to undercut the desired coercive
effect during gray-zone conflict.
First, American policy has lacked unity of effort, resulting in reactionary and
convoluted economic actions. Economic coercion for both short-term compellence
and long-term containment works best if the conditions that trigger and remove
sanctions are known.42 But as American policy consensus has evolved, US strategy
has been applied inconsistently in response to discrete Russian behavior.43 Before
February 2022, ambitious sanction packages showed all signs of political mission
creep, penalizing an ever-expanding range of behaviors from Ukraine to humanrights violations and rogue regime support.44 Unlike other policy tools, such as
diplomatic pressure and military deployment, economic sanction rollout has often
been piecemeal.45
Additionally, the implementation of the policy has suffered from competing
goals and expectations among branches and agencies of the US government,
particularly between Congress and the president.46 Though desynchronization
across agencies may typify US policy, the effect of this desynchronization has been
particularly insidious given the persistent nature of Russia’s malign influence. This
asymmetry has allowed Russia to allocate its economic means over time more
efficiently. The asymmetry has also reduced the United States’ overall coercive
effect, convoluting desired objectives and drawing resources away from Russia’s
most significant vulnerabilities.
A lack of broad international enforcement has also marred American policy.
International cooperation enables economic coercion by minimizing third-party
actors’ ability to offset or nullify intended effects.47 American unilateralism,
however, is first and foremost limited in terms of modality. Although tools of
41. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 143–49.
42. Drezner, “United States of Sanctions,” 152–53.
43. Michael Carpenter, “How to Make Sanctions on Russia Work,” National Interest (website),
December 18, 2018, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/12/18/how-to-make-sanctions-on-russia
-work/.
44. Welt et al., US Sanctions on Russia, 29–35.
45. Eugene Rumer and Richard Soklosky, Thirty Years of US Policy toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle
Be Broken? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019), 33.
46. Edward Fishman, “How to Fix America’s Failing Sanctions Policy,” Lawfare (blog), updated
June 4, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-fix-americas-failing-sanctions-policy#.
47. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 143–49.
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economic statecraft cover a wide area of financial, fiscal, trade, and monetary
policy, US-Russian policy has been limited to direct economic sanctions.48
American unilateralism has also been defined by limited international
cooperation. The United States’ economic actions have been increasingly
independent of the initial response to the Crimean crisis. Russian economic
interdependence and statecraft have exploited the unanimous consent
requirements of the EU, producing collective underbalancing against Russia
as states have sought to protect national energy and patronage interests.49
Multinational coordination has largely been isolated to the military sphere,
centering on the NATO European Deterrence Initiative and expenditure
requirements.50 Countries have fed upon each other via this unilateralism,
generating further deleterious effects. Reliance on sanctions threatens
partner-country sovereignty and reduces the range of cooperative policy options.
Reliance on independent action reduces domestic political willingness for more
substantive economic tools beyond sanctions. These fractures have weakened
the intended coercive effect by reducing the breadth and depth of overall
Western capability and signaling collective hesitance to use available means.
Finally, American economic coercion has lacked a nuanced method of
measuring success. The confounding nature of economic coercion, among
other nonmilitary means, requires a refined understanding of the effectiveness
of economic statecraft.51 During the Cold War, Soviet defense spending
assessments became important determinants of success.52 However, modern
US policy chronically underestimates Russia’s economic resilience during grayzone competition. For years, Russia studied the economic coercion of the United
States and mitigated the former’s economic vulnerability in relation to the
latter by slowly diversifying the former’s trade, reserve holdings, and payments
systems.53 Licitly, Russia took deliberate action to withstand economic pressure
by maintaining a large petroleum market share, low debt levels, and extensive
nondollar reserve holdings.54 Illicitly, Russian patronage networks have allowed
the Kremlin to bail out targeted officials and firms, compensating them with
48. Jonathan Falcone, “The People’s Bank of China’s Monetary Armament: Capabilities and Limitations of
Evolving Institutional Power,” Military Review (July–August 2020): 71–83.
49. Welt et al., US Sanctions on Russia, 39–44.
50. David Shlapak, The Russian Challenge (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 8–9.
51. Nicholas Mulder, The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2022), 295–97.
52. Barry Watts, “Net Assessment in the Era of Superpower Competition,” in Net Assessment and
Military Strategy: Retrospective and Prospective Essays, ed. Thomas Mahnken (New York: Cambria Press,
2020), 27–72.
53. Vadim Grishin, “The Economic Factors in U.S.-Russian Relations,” Program on New Approaches to
Research and Security in Eurasia (website), July 11, 2021, https://www.ponarseurasia.org/the-economic-factors
-in-u-s-russian-relations/.
54. Countering Russia: Assessing New Tools, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Daleep Singh, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s
Global Business and Economics Program).
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contracts, subsidies, and other rents.55 Russia’s successful use of nonmilitary means
to resist American sanctions reveals the symbolic and ineffective nature of US
economic policy.
Coercion is a form of negotiation in which an adversary signals its willingness
and capacity to hurt.56 Russian behavior signaled the country could withstand
the tools the West was willing and able to use below the threshold of armed
conflict. If the United States does not change its coercion strategy, the country
should only expect continued policy failure.

Modernizing US-Russian Policy through Improved Economic Statecraft
The United States must refocus its economic statecraft policy vis-à-vis Russia
to realign nonmilitary means and counter the illicit activities at the core of Russia’s
economic advantage. In short, the United States must create and signal additional
capacity to hurt Russia economically. This policy modernization achieves one
overarching goal—to build and focus economic means toward “latent force,” or the
withheld threat of violence.57 A more holistic and effective US strategy requires a
reassertion of three mutually supporting policy principles: domestic coordination,
international cooperation, and transatlantic transparency.

Figure 1: Policy response triad

Domestic Coordination
For decades, American economic statecraft has taken a back seat, lacking
vertical integration with jurisdictions spread across multiple agencies and
55. Carpenter, “Sanctions on Russia.”
56. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 3.
57. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3.
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horizontal integration to generate the holistic capability necessary to combat a
wide-ranging threat like Russia’s malign influence.58
Better domestic integration requires a realignment of Russian policy talent.
Although the Biden administration recently created a short-term Task Force
KleptoCapture aimed at the wealth of Russian oligarchs, a more sustained effort
is needed.59 One mechanism of improved integration could feature a standing
National Security Council task force that focuses on Russian influence due to
its increasing centrality to US executive action.60 The United States’ combatant
commands, such as United States European Command, represent another way
to promote coordination. Both options provide the cultural, diplomatic, and
intelligence expertise to build economic statecraft preemptively into current,
future, and contingency operations.
Regardless of the format, these structures should join members of the
Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury,
the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States, and the Office of the US Trade Representative.61
This interagency group serves three core roles:

•

Assess the changing Russian vulnerabilities to American economic
leverage.

•
•

Evaluate the effectiveness of US policy allocations over time.
Ensure the coordination of economic statecraft in interagency
campaign planning during competition and crisis.62

Economic tools must remain dynamic in response to changing licit and illicit
economic market forces. These policy and theater-level constructs (for example,
closing loopholes in existing policy or preemptively establishing triggers for
implementation) can synchronize the intended goals of economic coercion and
tailor policy over time to improve effectiveness.63
58. David H. McCormick, Charles E. Luftig, and James M. Cunningham, “Economic Might, National
Security, and the Future of American Statecraft,” Texas National Security Review 3, no. 3 (Summer 2020):
20–22.
59. Aruna Viswanatha, “DOJ Fleshes Out Aims of Its Anti-Oligarch ‘KleptoCapture’ Task Force,” Wall Street
Journal (website), March 11, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-03-11
/card/doj-fleshes-out-aims-of-its-anti-oligarch-kleptocapture-task-force-lzw2ejB6MwRCkq796NeH.
60. Undermining Democracy (statement of Michael Carpenter); and John Gants, White House Warriors
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2019), 209.
61. Michael O’Hanlon, The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War over Small Stakes
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2019), 151.
62. Elizabeth Rosenberg, Peter Harrell, and Ashley Feng, A New Arsenal for Competition: Coercive
Economic Measures in the US-China Relationship (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security,
April 2020), 40–44.
63. Fishman, “How to Fix.”
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Another mechanism for improving unity of effort is organizational priority.
Unlike in the defense, intelligence, and diplomatic communities, no standing
interagency process for publishing documents related to reoccurring, national,
economic statecraft strategy exists.64 Such a process would allow the relevant
agencies to signal, coordinate, and assess a major pivot in economic statecraft—
for instance, to begin prioritizing the countering of authoritarian influence over
the countering of the financing of terrorism, thereby transitioning the interagency
from a legacy policy developed after the September 11 attacks.65
A final mechanism of integration is by way of legal process. The US legal code
inhibits sharing financial information related to law enforcement and national
security—a gap readily exploited by Russian actors seeking to obfuscate any ties
to the Kremlin or its proxies.66 The United States needs a more suitable way of
negotiating anti-money laundering (AML) consistent with citizens’ data privacy
protections.67 Currently, federal agencies operate through a patchwork of laws
to navigate restrictive and outdated provisions, such as the 1974 Privacy Act.
Legal code reform is necessary for enabling whole-of-government AML processes
that extend civil-liberty protections to cover the data protection needs of modern
society.68 Designed to support federal law enforcement and private-business needs,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act represents a reform model for building
an apparatus that improves financial intelligence gathering within the American
banking system without infringing upon civil liberties.69
When coupled with a coordinating interagency body and proper prioritization,
legal process reform offers an impressive tool against malign economic influence
within the broader American financial system. Consider the example of negative
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States externalities. The
committee’s reforms are widely credited with limiting potentially subversive
foreign direct investment inflow into the United States.70 Although restricting
foreign direct investment inflow is sometimes an appropriate policy goal, it is not
an unalloyed good. Preventing licit foreign direct investment inflow also generates
the negative externality of licit but unattributable or illicit inflows. Without
64. Drezner, “United States of Sanctions,” 152.
65. Rudolph and Morley, Covert Foreign Money, 60.
66. Jack Reed, “Russian Financial Influence,” Congressional Record 164, no. 36 (2018): S1268–S1271;
and Undermining Democracy: Kremlin Tools of Malign Political Influence, Before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, 116th Cong. (2019)
(statement of Laura Rosenberger, director of the Alliance for Securing Democracy and senior fellow at the
German Marshall Fund of the United States).
67. “Losing the War: The War against Money Laundering Is Being Lost,” Economist (website),
April 17, 2022, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2021/04/12/the-war-against-money
-laundering-is-being-lost.
68. Jill I. Goldenziel and Manal Cheema, “New Fighting Words?: How US Law Hampers the Fight
against Information Warfare,” Journal of Constitutional Law 22, no. 1 (November 2019): 168.
69. Goldenziel and Cheema, “New Fighting Words?,” 136.
70. Rosenberg, Harrell, and Feng, New Arsenal for Competition, 16.
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proper assessment and monitoring, this dynamic might generate an offsetting
effect representing a net loss for American interests.71 Armed with a legal process
similar to that codified in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, an interagency
coordinating body could assess and refine policy over time.
Improved domestic coordination demonstrates national determination and
the capacity to deliver economic pain consistently over time. Relative to the
United States, Russia benefits from the longevity of its senior civilian and
military leaders, enabling the pursuit of consistent strategy. On the other hand,
Russia has long believed US policy is erratic due to the US electoral process and
political incentive structure, thereby creating vulnerability to political warfare.72
A more sustainable model of domestic coordination that is aligned to both
interagency requirements and national values delivers a powerful coercive effect by
addressing these perceived weaknesses.

International Cooperation
Improved international cooperation is essential for generating broad
enforcement of strategy vis-à-vis Russia. The United States must be realistic,
developing politically feasible options for partner countries to minimize
underbalancing. First, the United States should seek unity of effort within
like-minded structures—both established international organizations and
incipient regional organizations. Second, when the United States must
challenge economic paradigms, it must ruthlessly prioritize them.
Improved financial regulation and intelligence sharing represent one avenue
of international cooperation. Today, the global AML system suffers from critical
structural flaws because most governments have unsuccessfully outsourced
regulation to the private sector, leaving pockets of excellence balkanized within
Western financial intelligence.73 The United States should augment the personnel
and budgetary resources of the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Intelligence
Unit (the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) and partner it with similar
state institutions overseas—notably, the Group of Seven’s Financial Action Task
Force and affiliated regional organizations.74
Additionally, the United States can bolster political support for the EU
Directorate-General for Competition. This office’s actions against stateowned enterprises such as Gazprom serve as an emerging check on malign
71. James Jackson, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), RL33388
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated July 2018), 41–43.
72. Thomas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare (New York:
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2020), 5–8.
73. “Losing the War.”
74. “Losing the War.”
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economic influence. In 2018, the office’s investigation of Gazprom’s gas-market
monopolization prompted Russia to make concessions in its long-term gas
pricing to avoid a multibillion-euro fine. These market-oriented concessions
threaten Gazprom’s future domination of the Eurasian energy sector and build
advance cooperation on geo-economic action (such as regulation and sanctions),
thereby minimizing tendencies for political compromise or underbalancing that
dilutes effectiveness.75
The United States can also improve cooperation by fostering independence
from Russian gas imports. For decades, natural gas served as a critical bridge of
mutual dependence from Russia to Europe.76 Thus, the United States must work
with the current of European gas politics to manage the broad, international
coalition required for sanction efficacy. First, the United States should adopt a
“small yard but high fence” concept to protect the most critical American sanctions
against Russia. This approach prioritizes the prevention of Western investment
and technology transfer to Russia’s energy sector—a major, long-term liability to
regime survivability because Russia requires technological innovation to access
and exploit its vast reserves in the Poluostrov Yamal.77 These sanctions threaten the
future market dominance of Russia’s state-owned energy firms, the Kremlin’s most
controllable geo-economic asset.78
Gas independence also requires American support for European energy and
investment diversification by promoting regional energy competition that decreases
the Russian market share. To reduce the importation of energy, the United States
can promote other European options, such as north-south connectors with Nordic
and Mediterranean nations, the recently opened EU Southern Gas Corridor,
or the expansion of European access to imports of liquefied natural gas.79 This
short-term diversification of European energy can replace as much as 60 percent
of current Russian-gas imports.80 Imports of liquefied natural gas to Europe
represent a Russian economic vulnerability as Russia’s legacy pipeline delivery
systems decrease in market efficiency.81

75. Mathew Heim, How Can European Competition Law Address Market Distortions Caused by State-Owned
Enterprises?, Policy Contribution Issue No. 18 (Brussels: Bruegel, December 2019).
76. Thane Gustafson, The Bridge: Natural Gas in a Redivided Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2020), 5–10.
77. Countering Russia: Assessing New Tools, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Leon Aron, resident scholar and director of Russian studies at the
American Enterprise Institute).
78. Ion Iftimie, Natural Gas: As an Instrument of Russian State Power (Washington, DC: Westphalia Press,
2014), 103–5.
79. Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means, 205–9.
80. “Can the World Cope without Russia’s Commodity Stash?,” Economist (website), updated
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To replace market investment opportunities, the United States can negotiate
bilateral investment treaties to liberalize private capital flows and reduce the risk
of Russian state economic capture.82 In particular, the United States can support
burgeoning green-energy production by leveraging the sector’s increasing regional
technological advances and political salience.83 Ultimately, the Europeans would
best achieve this diversification. The United States should support a continental
gas strategy that collectively assesses individual country exposure, shifts excess
stocks within the euro area, and establishes funds to compensate countries and
sectors damaged from ongoing economic sanctions.84
Financial regulation improvement and European gas-trade independence
will require the United States to withhold economic force selectively through
other inducements. One way is leveraging Specially Designated Nationals
and Blocked Persons List exemptions for key political concessions in the
Russian-gas relationship. Formally known as licensing, this process temporarily
suspends economic sanctions in return for progress on desired objectives.85 The
United States should apply these tools on a bilateral or limited, multilateral
basis as needed to mitigate the effects of regional underbalancing. Alternatively,
the United States can selectively apply exemptions to foster competition among
Russia’s burgeoning independent gas producers who increasingly threaten Russia’s
state-sponsored dominance of gas exports.86 Another positive inducement is
providing diplomatic and economic clarity for Western firms to reenter the
Eurasian market as sanctions are reduced.87 This strategy could include clear
messaging about the triggers for sanction imposition and removal as well as
financial safeguards (such as capital liquidity and tax provisions). A final critical
economic inducement should seek to preserve third-party country access,
including that of China, to American, European, and US-dollar markets.
Transatlantic market access is an important incentive for minimizing Russian
sanction leakage by third parties, such as China.88
Alliances and partnerships inherently come with trade-offs. Opportunity cost
abounds in the prioritization of financial intelligence and energy independence.
But these mechanisms are rarely used to communicate commitment. As the
leader of a diverse coalition of allies, the United States must welcome trade-offs
amongst allies to secure a common purpose and key coercive tools.
82. “Bilateral Investment Treaties,” Office of the United States Trade Representative (website), accessed
March 18, 2022, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties.
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84. Poitiers et al., “Kremlin’s Gas Wars.”
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Transatlantic Transparency
Finally, the United States can modernize its economic firepower by
increasing the transparency of cross-border financial transactions. Data may
not be “the new oil,” but data are the key to understanding the allocation and
effectiveness of Russian economic means. As the preeminent global hub
for economic transactions, the West’s privileged access to financial flows
is its premier means of network power to exert international influence.89
In practice, Russia’s malign influence exploits state-level variations of
financial law and regulation to avoid attribution and complicate response.
Since 2006, just 17 percent of known malign Russian finance cases have been
illicit.90 Transparency is also constrained by evolving financial engineering and
reporting procedures (such as electronic currency procedures and alternate
clearing mechanisms). Financial operations that are not dollar-denominated, such
as Bitcoin, Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, and central bank digital
currencies, threaten future American advantage vis-à-vis Russia. These forms of
exchange decrease US financial access, placing bank liabilities directly within the
citizenry or outside the US-dominated commercial bank structure.91 Privileged
data access is a key US policy tool, and regulation-based financial transparency is
essential to maintaining the strength of this tool.
Financial transparency improvement begins by closing loopholes in the
transatlantic alliance structure. The New York City-, London-, and Brusselsbased financial industry continues to dominate global market flows. The industry
is also the hub of most global financial transparency mechanisms as states have
increasingly decentralized AML enforcement to the commercial banking sector.92
The United States should work with transatlantic financial organizations to
improve international financial transparency standards, such as defining the
ultimate beneficiaries of limited liability.93
The Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 presents one opportunity. This law
requires first-time disclosure of individual ownership of an underlying financial
equity to the Department of the Treasury.94 The act is not without drawbacks.
The law does not cover pooled investment vehicles (such as trusts or privateequity funds), nor does it augment resources to administrate and oversee the
89. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks
Shape State Coercion,” International Security 44, no. 1 (Summer 2019): 42.
90. Rudolph and Morley, Covert Foreign Money, 10.
91. Francesca Carapella and Jean Flemming, “Central Bank Digital Currency: A Literature Review,” Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (website), updated November 9, 2020, https://www.federalreserve
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94. William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, H.R. 6395,
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reporting.95 Nonetheless, the act represents a major milestone for improving
the financial community’s financial transparency standards and enforcement.
The law is one of many ways the United States can improve the transatlantic
financial system. The Biden administration could eliminate exceptions to the
USA PATRIOT Act that allow exemptions from AML provisions for real estate
and luxury transportation dealers.96 The administration could also implement
section 885 of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires
beneficial ownership reporting within federal acquisition databases.97 Finally,
Congress can pass the ENABLERS Act, which would establish more financial
transparency requirements (such as beneficial ownership reporting) for US law,
real estate, and accounting firms.98
Transparency can also come from improved international financial institution
reporting. The inability of international financial institutions to manage changing
financial engineering trends over time contributes to the institutions’ increasing
insignificance and enables Kremlin operations.99 For instance, definitions of key
bilateral flows (such as hydrocarbons and military expenditures and investment)
and remittance flows vary across states and institutions, making Russian means
more obscure.100 Limited reform of international financial institutions could
streamline financial flow accounting and authorize penalties for actors who violate
revised transparency norms. Such reform could also support the construction
of databases for law enforcement and intelligence that could contain beneficial
ownership and transaction history information.101
Transatlantic financial transparency is crucial to building the latent economic
force required to coerce Russia and combat its malign influence. Armed with this
knowledge, the United States can design more effective sanctions and market
pressures or reallocate support that builds resilience in key states and sectors. More
importantly, the consolidation of transparency norms among a global coalition
would be a critical signal to the Kremlin and build future capability to monitor
and penalize Russia’s malign influence.

95. Thomas Bogle et al., Congress Enacts Significant Changes to the US Anti-Money Laundering Regime
(Philadelphia: Dechert LLP, February 2021), 3.
96. Jodi Vittori, “Biden Must Go beyond Sanctions to Rid the US Financial System of Dirty Money,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (website), March 8, 2022, https://carnegieendowment
.org/2022/03/08/biden-must-go-beyond-sanctions-to-rid-u.s.-financial-system-of-dirty-money-pub-86589.
97. Vittori, “Biden Must Go.”
98. Vittori, “Biden Must Go.”
99. McCormick, Luftig, and Cunningham, “Economic Might,” 18.
100. Orsini, “Guns, Butter, and Tweets,” 34.
101. Vittori, “Biden Must Go.”

Russia and China

Orsini

51

Communicating Commitment to the Financial Industry
Democracies often struggle to communicate resolve to their targets due to
the strength and quantity of various interest groups.102 The limiting factor for
US economic coercion is not capacity; instead, the limiting factor is coordination
and communication. Despite its dominant position in international financial
markets, the United States’ inability to control outbound investment by private
citizens severely weakens its financial sanctions.103 Fueled by competition among
transatlantic banking firms, the financial lobby has grown in strength since
the 1980s, achieving a broad trend of deregulation.104 In many ways, this lobby
exemplifies the domestic and international challenges facing the United States
vis-à-vis Russian economic statecraft. The United States must work with the
industry through moral suasion, market incentives, or failure of risk reform.
One way to realign incentives is by signaling the use of section 311 of the
USA PATRIOT Act against Russian malign financial networks. Section 311
compels American banks to guard the sanctity of the American financial system
against illicit financial activity by designated groups. Whereas market forces
usually weaken conventional trade sanctions, section 311 leverages these structures
as banks naturally seek to protect their access to private-market liquidity.105 Section
311 combines governmental suasion and market incentives into a powerful,
geo-economic weapon for safeguardomg the larger American financial system.
Since its inception, section 311 has aligned US and industry goals as banks have
moved out of self-interest to isolate the laundering and threat financing of state
actors and terrorist networks.106 The threat of section-311 action following ongoing
economic sanctions on the Russian banking system would be a powerful signal of
more latent force and increased targeting of malign finance.
With proper signaling, the United States can use this tool to align state and
market goals, influencing financial industry reform without formally triggering
section 311. The strength of section 311 derives from potential use, leveraging
market pressures to align the goals of banks and government against money
laundering practices. Numerous actions could increase the perceived plausibility
of section-311 action. The United States could provide planning guidance for
banks to deleverage Russia-linked liabilities. In addition, the United States
could create Federal Reserve liquidity provision vehicles to support banking
systems. Alternatively, the United States could take on financial lobby influence
102. Biddle, “Coercion Theory.”
103. Steil and Litan, Financial Statecraft, 159–62.
104. Adam Tooze, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crisis Changed the World (New York:
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by strengthening Foreign Agents Registration Act provisions and passing
federal defamation law to restrict baseless libel claims.107 Finally, the United
States could promote a voluntary code of conduct amongst leading US banks
to resist Russia’s malign economic influence, encouraging both public-private
transparency and cooperation.108 Fundamentally, the United States signals a
commitment by consistently executing economic statecraft, including herding its
powerful financial system.

Conclusion: Consolidating Economic Gains in the Gray Zone
Acknowledgment that potential adversaries such as Russia have studied and
countered the United States’ capabilities and willingness to use military coercion
since the Persian Gulf War is almost axiomatic.109 Much less appreciated is
potential adversaries have studied and countered the American economic
playbook. For years, Russia has exploited a fundamental misalignment in the
United States’ deterrence policy through licit and illicit economic means to
a gain relative advantage in gray-zone competition. Although US policy has
stagnated and suffered from a lack of domestic unity of effort, broad international
enforcement, and transparent measures of success, Russia has continued to shape
and complicate the human, physical, and informational dimensions of the modern
operating environment for American strategists, military leaders, and diplomats.
The United States’ economic statecraft must return the favor. A combination
of mutually reinforcing domestic integration, international coordination, and
transatlantic transparency tailored toward unique Russian economic weaknesses
would allow the United States to organize, galvanize, and prioritize its ways and
means more effectively.
As the United States participates in the largest war in Europe since
World War II, the nation should heed the lessons of postwar peace. The
institutions developed and refined in the 1940s—from the Bretton Woods
system to the UN—fundamentally altered the political and economic context
to thwart Soviet goals.110 At times, improved foreign and domestic economic
coordination and transparency will strain the United States’ geopolitical
position. This strain, however, is the necessary pain of long-term coalition
management.111 Today, the United States stands at the beginning of an
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unprecedented economic war with Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. The
United States must simultaneously set conditions to sustain its coalition for
long-term economic coercion and return to competition on better terms. During
a conflict, the distinction between success and failure is most fragile. Good
strategy, however, consolidates gains to make them endure.112 Largely undeterred
by previous US gray-zone policy, Russia has aggressively exploited this arena
to gain geostrategic advances. Under unprecedented economic strain, Russia is
likely to need its gray-zone advantage now more than ever. The United States
should harness the domestic and international policy window created by the
2022 Russo-Ukrainian war to consolidate the former’s economic gains, thereby
denying strategic opportunity to Russia.
The United States must achieve objectives in the space between war and
peace in a manner commensurate with the nation’s values and means. This
imperative and the associated future coercive objectives potentially represent the
United States’ preeminent foreign policy challenge in the twenty-first century.
Russia is one test. On this battlefield, the dollar is stronger than the sword.
The United States’ strategy must adapt and reform priorities and processes to
wield its best weapons. Economic statecraft can no longer be a complementary
effort; rather, economic statecraft must be the decisive force in generating the
desired coercive strategy.
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